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Funding the Costs of Disease Outbreaks Caused by Non Vaccination 
Charlotte A. Moser, Dorit Reiss, Robert L. Schwartz 
Introduction 
Preventable diseases not only cause suffering and physical harm, they also impose 
financial costs on private individuals and public authorities. By disregarding evidence of 
the safety and effectiveness of vaccines and choosing not to vaccinate their children some 
parents are increasing the risk of outbreaks and their attendant costs. Since non-
vaccinating can directly lead to costly outbreaks, this paper argues that it is both fair and 
desirable to impose those costs upon those making the choice not to vaccinate.  There are, 
in fact, strong policy reasons to support doing so regardless of whether we use an 
approach-based-fault or a no-fault framework. Not only can the decision not to vaccinate 
be seen as culpable, aside from the culpability consideration it is appropriate to compel 
those deciding not to vaccinate to internalize the costs in order to prevent free riding and 
to mitigate harms to others.   
This article addresses the legal tools that can be used to manage the costs associated 
with outbreaks, focusing on those that do not require demonstrating fault. In particular, 
the article considers the imposition of a fee or a tax on non-vaccinators so that those who 
avoid immunization are required to internalize the costs associated with their decisions.   
Costs Associated with Non-Vaccination 
Widespread use of vaccines has transformed the landscape of medicine. Diseases 
that were once significant causes of morbidity and mortality are, in some cases, no longer 
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suspected when patients report with symptoms characteristic of these diseases (Chen, 
2011; Sugerman, 2010; Calugar, 2006; Lee, 2000). In fact, according to a recent study by 
William van Panhuis and colleagues (van Panhuis, 2013), vaccines have prevented about 
103 million cases of disease since 1924. Despite the unquestionable effectiveness and 
proven safety of vaccines, some parents are concerned enough about the safety of 
vaccines that they choose not to have their children vaccinated (Salmon, 2005). While the 
number of completely unvaccinated children remains low, pockets of unimmunized 
individuals make some communities particularly susceptible to outbreaks (Omer, 2006; 
Omer, 2008). In recent years, outbreaks of the most contagious diseases, such as measles 
and pertussis, have started to reappear in communities throughout the country (MMWR, 
2008; Ortega-Sanchez, 2014; MMWR, 2012).  Recent examples include outbreaks of 
measles in  New York, California, Washington, and Ohio; and one of mumps in Ohio. A 
recent press announcements by the CDC stated that the number of measles cases in the 
United States in the first half of 2014 was the highest since 1994.    
Outbreaks are more likely to occur where pockets of susceptible people cause a 
breakdown in herd immunity. Herd immunity results when enough individuals are 
immunized, so that the few who are not are still afforded protection. In fact, data have 
shown that it is better to be an unimmunized person in a highly vaccinated community 
than to be an immunized person in a community of susceptible people (Feikin, 2000; von 
den Hof, 2002). because the disease will be less likely to penetrate a highly vaccinated 
community, so it is less likely that an unimmunized person will be infected. In contrast, 
an infectious agent will spread more readily through a lesser vaccinated population 
resulting in infections in both unimmunized individuals as well as those for whom the 
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vaccine was not effective. When families choose not to immunize themselves or their 
children, discussions often focus on the health consequences that the breakdown in herd 
immunity imposes on individuals and society. However, society must also absorb some 
of the financial burden related to cases of infectious diseases.  
When an individual contracts a preventable disease, the costs are typically covered 
by the individual or family, their insurance company or, if they lack private insurance, a 
federally funded program, such as Medicare or Medicaid. Individual costs are incurred 
for medications (over-the-counter or prescription), co-pays and uncovered procedures or 
treatments, and loss of productivity (time at doctor visits or not at work). Several 
variables affect these costs, including who in the family is ill, which disease they have, 
the severity of illness, and the extent of their private or public medical coverage. Lee and 
Pichichero studied costs to families during a pertussis outbreak in New York during 
1995-96 and found costs to families were $181 per ill adult, $254 per ill adolescent, $308 
per ill child, or $2,822 per ill infant (Lee, 2000). In 2014 US dollars, these costs would 
range from $278 - $4,331. While these costs could seem exorbitant to individual families, 
they are minor when compared with the lifetime medical costs for an individual who is 
permanently harmed as well as the costs associated with stopping the spread of an 
infectious disease. Both of which are significantly higher and ultimately absorbed by 
society.  
Costs associated with permanent harm 
While most infectious diseases can lead to permanent harm, rubella and 
meningococcal disease may be among the worst. For example, a pregnant woman 
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infected with rubella may miscarry, deliver early, suffer a spontaneous abortion or 
stillbirth, or have a child born with congenital rubella syndrome (CRS). Children affected 
by CRS can suffer deafness, heart or eye damage, mental retardation, skeletal damage, 
autism, or some combination of these. If the child survives, the cost to care for the child 
over his or her lifetime is estimated to be about $143,000 (2014 US dollars; Babigumira, 
2013). Likewise, about 10-20 percent of the people who survive meningococcal infection, 
which can cause bloodstream infection (sepsis) or meningitis, will have permanent 
consequences such as deafness, limb amputations, or neurologic disabilities. Costs 
associated with acute disease and lifetime medical costs for these individuals have been 
estimated to range from $87,261 for deafness to $253,723 for someone with multiple 
amputations (2014 US dollars; Shepard, 2005). Most of the costs associated with 
permanent harm caused by an infectious disease are absorbed by the family and its 
insurer.  Because private insurers base their fee structures on calculated risks, costs 
associated with permanent harm are passed on to participants through premiums. For 
those insured through public programs, such as Medicare or Medicaid, costs associated 
with permanent harm are absorbed by tax payers. 
 
Costs associated with containment measures 
When an infectious disease is identified, one of the most pressing concerns becomes 
stopping the spread to others. Containment measures include limiting exposure of 
infected individuals to others who may be susceptible; identifying those who were 
exposed; monitoring for additional cases; establishing diagnostic testing and preventive 
or treatment measures, such as vaccine clinics; alerting and updating healthcare providers 
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and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC); and addressing the public and 
the media (Ortega-Sanchez, 2014). A measles outbreak in 2005 showcases the 
complexities (Parker, 2006): 
When an unvaccinated six year old was hospitalized with measles in 
Illinois, public health officials in that state traced the child’s exposure to 
a church gathering of 500 people two weeks prior – in Indiana. When 
the Indiana health department began investigating, they identified the 
source case as an unvaccinated teenager who had returned from a 
church-mission trip. Despite symptoms of illness, she attended the 
church gathering where she not only directly infected the hospitalized 
child, but also seventeen others attending the gathering and one other 
person during a visit with a neighbor (19 first generation infections). In 
addition, thirteen additional people were infected by close (household) 
contact with the 19 directly infected individuals (second generation 
infections). Public health officials attempted to contact the 500 picnic 
attendees as well as anyone in contact with what ultimately became 34 
people infected over three generations of spread. Workers had to 
ascertain vaccination status of attendees, attempt to identify additional 
cases, and try to get unvaccinated individuals vaccinated. Containment 
activities involved “ninety-nine public health officers and infection-
control personnel working in 12 health departments and health care 
facilities. . . .”(p.449). These personnel reported 3,650 hours of work, 
4,800 telephone calls, 5,500 miles driven, and 550 lab samples to 
contain the outbreak started by a single unvaccinated teen returning from 
travel.   
 
The cost of containment for public health authorities was $62,216. The total cost of 
the outbreak was over two hundred thousand dollars (see Table 1).  
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While the aforementioned outbreak started at a church gathering, outbreaks can 
begin anywhere that people gather. For example, in 2000, a measles-infected traveler 
exposed 335 passengers on a plane (Lasher, 2004). Although passengers were alerted of 
the potential exposure on the plane, public health officials decided to follow-up with 
additional information the next day leading them to track down passengers at hotels, in 
tour groups and by telephone. In this case 97 percent of the passengers were residents of 
Japan, two percent were U.S. citizens and 1 percent was from Indonesia.  
Likewise, a measles outbreak in Pennsylvania in 2007 was associated with an 
international youth sporting event (Chen, 2010). The index case was an international 
participant in the sporting event who was ill during travel. Because he was staying in a 
residential compound associated with the event, eight U.S. teams and eight international 
teams as well as their coaches and event staff were potentially exposed. Likewise, people 
on the child’s two flights were exposed as were nine corporate representatives working 
the event. One of these nine representatives got measles, but not before traveling to Texas 
and visiting three college campuses before being diagnosed. Two college students were 
infected by this corporate representative. In total, seven cases occurred (including the 
index case) and 1,250 people were potentially exposed in California, Georgia, Illinois, 
Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, Pennsylvania and Texas.  
Because each situation is different, the extent of and need for containment measures 
varies. In addition, the responsibility for and distribution of the financial burden of 
associated with containment may also vary. For example, in 2008 a measles-infected 
traveler visited a hospital resulting in an additional 13 cases, most of which were 
acquired by others in the hospital at that time or secondary cases related to those people. 
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Costs to that hospital were estimated to be around $632,084 ($695,993 in 2014 US); most 
of which was related to wages and salaries of furloughed workers (Chen, 2011). In 
contrast, when a refugee entered the US while infected with measles in 2010, 
containment measures were spearheaded by the state public health department, but also 
involved personnel from the local public health and refugee departments, CDC, and 
hospital personnel. While the containment succeeded in stopping the spread of measles to 
others, the $25,000 ($26,818 in 2014 US dollars) costs associated with this single case 
fell completely to the government (Coleman, 2012).  
 
Paying the costs associated with infectious diseases	  
While the government supports public health, the annual budget does not typically 
garner large percentages of the whole. For example, of the $973.6 billion in the FY14 
federal budget, only $4.6 was earmarked for public health (US Government Spending, 
2014), and a recent report by Trust for America’s Health called for increases in core 
funding at all levels of public health after presenting data showing that variability in 
health statistics between states was related to variation in funding (Trust, 2013). In 
addition, public health departments are not funded for unexpected events, which means 
that during an outbreak caused by an infectious disease, departments may need to 
reassign staff and reallocate funds to complete containment measures in a timely manner 
(Ortega-Sanchez, 2014). A 1995 outbreak in Minnesota is instructive (Osterholm, 2001): 
 
Nine cases of invasive meningococcal disease with one death and seven 
cases of streptococcal disease with four deaths occurred over a one 
month period during the winter of 1995 in Minnesota. The cases 
occurred in two towns and were coincident with influenza season 
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thereby complicating diagnoses in those presenting with respiratory 
symptoms. Containment measures included immunizing 30,000 
residents; 26,000 of whom were vaccinated over a 4-day period. Public 
health staff worked 18-hour days for more than 23 days; in all, more 
than 600 people were involved in the public health response. Costs of 
vaccine alone were $1.2 million ($1.8 million 2014 US dollars). The 
state health department’s budget for that year was $2.2 million ($3.4 
million 2014 US dollars). While the state legislature provided an 
emergency appropriation for vaccine costs, the local hospital, which had 
to set up a separate emergency area, was never reimbursed.  
 
Table 1 summarizes studies of costs associated with investigating and containing 
recent cases and outbreaks of infectious diseases throughout the US.  
 
Costs and Savings Associated with Vaccination 
Recently, researchers at the CDC compared the costs of the vaccination program 
with the costs savings over the lifetime of a single birth cohort (Zhou, 2014). Using the 
2009 US recommended immunization schedule and a hypothetical U.S. birth cohort of 
more than 4.2 million children, the researchers calculated estimated cases of disease and 
deaths as well as the direct and societal costs associated with the diseases, 
immunizations, and net differences. Direct costs included inpatient and outpatient visits 
as well as outbreak control; indirect costs included loss of productivity and premature 
death. In addition to preventing about 42,000 deaths and 20 million cases of disease, 
vaccines were estimated to save about $14.7 billion (2014 US dollars) in direct costs and 
$75 billion (2014 US dollars) in societal costs over the lifetime of the cohort.  
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Costs of Outbreaks in the Eyes of the Law  
The costs associated with outbreaks are unquestionably substantial and many 
constitute legally compensable damages. For example, direct costs of a tortious act are 
compensable and, in a case concerning a preventable infectious disease, may include the 
costs of treating current cases and preventing further ones. In addition, when an 
individual has been afflicted with an infectious disease their costs may include lost 
earnings, future lost earnings (losing the ability to work generally or to work in specific 
types of jobs), physical and emotional pain and suffering (as allowed by the particular 
state), and subsequent decrease in life expectancy. Additional relevant costs are costs 
associated with inability to perform household tasks. If the afflicted individual dies as a 
result of the disease, relatives of the individual can sue for wrongful death, and for the 
harm they suffered as a result of the loss, including economic contributions that 
individual would have made, lost value of services, and loss of companionship.  
Individuals may also recover for pain and suffering, including physical pain and 
emotional harm accompanying a physical injury or illness (though some states limit pain 
and suffering awards in some or all contexts).   In some rare cases, where behavior is 
especially culpable, for example, intentionally exposing a child to chickenpox, punitive 
damages may also be appropriate.  
 
The Justification for Recouping Costs 
Whether it is appropriate to compel an individual to bear the costs associated with 
the decision to not vaccinate is an important starting point to this discussion. It is 
especially important in terms of those costs generally imposed on the public purse and 
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financed through taxation for the benefit of all. Sometimes, society does pay for 
problematic choices made by individuals. For example, individuals are generally not 
required to pay for police activity caused because they got into a dangerous situation. 
This is not always the case, however. For example, when individuals tortuously cause 
damages to public property, they are responsible for the damages even though the 
property has been purchased and maintained with public funds (Pennsylvania v. Gen. 
Pub. Utils. Corp., 710 F.2d 117, 122-23 (3d Cir. 1983)).  
Whether we use a fault or a no fault basis, there are powerful public policy reasons 
to compel those choosing not to vaccinate to bear the costs associated with their actions 
(Caplan, 2012 #4148).  
 
A Fault-Based Argument for Recouping Costs 
Not vaccinating is, arguably, at least negligent. As mentioned above, the risks of 
vaccinating are substantially smaller than the risks of not vaccinating (Calandrillo, 2004) 
As a result, vaccination is supported by the overwhelming majority of doctors, scientists 
and policy makers. Both from a risk/benefit analysis and through a community norm lens, 
the failure to vaccinate is problematic. The justifications for not vaccinating are often 
based on information that is simply incorrect (Kennedy, Brown et al. 2005). In truth, 
modern anti-vaccine arguments are surprisingly similar to those used in the early days of 
vaccines, and are no better supported by evidence today than they were in the 19th 
century or the early 20th (Offit 2010). 
Unlike intentional torts, negligence does not require actual knowledge that one’s 
understanding of the risks is wrong or that one is making a risky choice. As long as the 
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decision maker should have known that the decision was unreasonable, then the decision 
is negligent. Given the scientific consensus supporting vaccines, the abundant 
information from reputable sources supporting immunization, and the problematic 
sources relied upon by those who choose not to vaccinate, it is easy to support the claim 
that those who choose not to vaccinate should know they are making an unreasonable 
choice. As is the case here, when an individual engages in behavior that free rides on 
others, puts others at risks, and is unreasonable or even reckless, there is strong 
justification to require the individual to internalize the costs of that behavior.  
 
A No Fault-Based Argument for Recouping Costs 
An argument can be made that the choice not to vaccinate is not always negligent. 
In reality, the reason for failing to vaccinate children is rarely the result of parents 
forgetting to bring children to the pediatrician or the pediatrician’s failure to remember to 
provide the vaccination. Rather, failure to vaccinate is occasionally the result of 
intentional actions based on serious religious or philosophical principles or is the result of 
safety concerns. In most cases, we do not categorize principle-based decisions as 
“negligent,” even when most of the society rejects the same principles.  For example, the 
law does not characterize a woman’s decision to carry a pregnancy to term and not to 
have an abortion following a negligently performed tubal ligation as a negligent failure to 
mitigate damages.  Because there is sufficiently widespread support for an individual 
woman’s right to choose to have a baby or choose to have an abortion, no court has ever 
declared that choosing one option over the other is negligent.  Similarly, Jehovah’s 
Witnesses generally are not found to be negligent for refusing medically necessary blood 
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transfusions on religious grounds, even though the vast majority of the society rejects 
their religiously based principle.1  Whether we are willing to declare a parent to be 
negligent for failing to vaccinate a child may be a harder question, but it involves the 
same considerations, especially when it is done for religious reasons. A case can be made 
based in part on the reasoning in Prince v. Massachusetts, that parents cannot use their 
religious principles to endanger a child’s health (Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 
166-67 (1944)). In fact, some jurisdictions have applied a recklessness standard and 
convicted parents for manslaughter when the reasons underlying decisions that led to a 
child’s death were religious (Commonwealth v. Twitchell, 617 N.E.2d 609 (Mass. 1993); 
State v. Norman, 808 P.2d 1159 (Wash. App. 1991)). This conclusion is not, however, 
obvious, nor is it consistent with the prevailing view of negligence in the tort context. 
The second alternative, deciding not to vaccinate based upon ill-founded safety 
concerns, is more obviously akin to negligence. Acting according to your best judgment 
but choosing a larger risk can be negligent (Vaughan v. Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 
(C.P.) (1837) (“[W]hether the Defendant had acted honestly and bona fide to the best of 
his own judgment . . . would leave so vague a line as to afford no rule at all . . . . [Because 
the judgments of individuals are . . . ] as variable as the length of the foot of each . . . we 
ought rather to adhere to the rule which requires in all cases a regard to caution such as a 
man of ordinary prudence would observe”)). Sincere belief that your choice is the correct 
one does not make it any less negligent when it imposes risks on others. Even in those 
cases, however, a court may find for the defendant on the basis that an error of judgment 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 One court has been willing to reduce damages for a plaintiff who agree to forgo blood transfusions and 
subsequently suffered greater injury because she could be provided blood, but that was justified by some 
version of the doctrine of assumption of the risk rather than contributory or comparative negligence 
(Shorter v. Drury, 695 P.2d 116 (1985), cert. denied Shorter v. Drury, 474 U.S. 827 (1985)). 
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is not always negligent (Reed v. Tacoma Ry. & Power Comp., 188 P. 409 (Wash. 1921)). 
Given the abundance of anti-vaccine misinformation on the Internet (Wolfe, 2005) some 
judges or juries may find that the decision not to vaccinate was an error on judgment, 
rather than a negligent act.  
However, even if the decision to forego vaccination is not regarded as negligent, 
imposing the cost on the decision maker is justified for a number of reasons. The most 
important reason is that the question of childhood vaccination imposes unusual pressures 
upon parents which can be analogized to the prisoner’s dilemma, whereby it is in the 
interest of each individual to make a decision that will undermine the social interest of all 
of the decision makers.  Assuming that there is substantial value in herd immunity and 
that there are some adverse side effects of immunization that cannot be controlled, each 
individual child would be better off if that child were not vaccinated (so she would avoid 
any risk of side effects) and every other child were vaccinated (giving the one 
unvaccinated child the protection of herd immunity).  In other words, there are some 
circumstances where virtually everyone else in the community is vaccinated – in which 
parents would be acting rationally in deciding not to vaccinate their children, as long as 
their only consideration is the health of that child.  In these cases, people would rely – 
intentionally or not - on others to protect them or their children against diseases rather 
than take the small risk vaccines pose.  In other words, they would be free riding on herd 
immunity (Fine, 2011).  
This situation can also be analogized to the tragedy of the commons, where a 
common good is put at risk by individuals acting in their own self-interest. Here the 
commons – the disease free state of an immunized community – is put at risk by people 
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who depend upon that commons for their own benefit.  While people sought to opt out of 
vaccination from the earliest days of immunization for the same reasons that are now 
advanced, this problem was not so severe when parents often saw children who were 
harmed by the diseases we vaccinate against and understood the risks facing their own 
children.  Today, few parents have ever seen these conditions and, as a result, most do not 
fully understand the potentially terrible consequences of these preventable diseases. On 
the other hand, stories of vaccine injuries, most of which, like the claim that vaccines 
cause autism, are not based on credible medical evidence are advanced by anti-vaccine 
movements, and may easily scare parents.  
Regardless of whether a parent’s decision to forego vaccination is made as a 
conscious decision to “hide in the herd,” or is based upon an incorrect belief that  their 
children are not really at risk from preventable diseases or that the risks of vaccines are 
greater than those of the diseases, in all of these cases the parents’ decisions not to 
immunize threaten both the social consensus on vaccination and the herd immunity on 
which they rely. We can justify imposing costs upon these parents both as a deterrence 
mechanism, which may force them to consider the costs associated with their decisions, 
and as a matter of fairness, to prevent them from forcing others to pay for the risks 
created by their decisions.  
From a public policy perspective, not vaccinating imposes avoidable costs on 
government which lead to decreased funding for other important public health programs. 
Not vaccinating also increases the risk of outbreak to the community by undermining 
herd immunity. Imposing costs upon those who choose not to vaccinate can help deter 
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individuals from making such problematic choices without limiting their autonomy with 
a vaccination mandate.  
One possible claim is that by allowing school immunization requirements, the 
legislature had provided a right not to vaccinate and therefore imposing costs is 
inappropriate. Even if our proposal was focused on common law suits, we believe that 
claim unjustified: exemptions from school immunization requirements balance public 
health with parental rights in the context of the child’s education, considering the 
importance of education for children. There is no indication that in passing them the 
legislature considered the question of the cost of harms from non-vaccination. Further, 
acting legally is not always acting reasonably, and costs are imposed, under our system, 
for acts that are legal but not reasonable when those acts harm others (Reiss, 2014). But 
since our remedy is a statutory one, this is not a problem: in the same way that the 
legislature can choose to provide or not provide an exemption, the legislature may impose 
costs on those using exemptions.   
 
Legal Tools for Imposing Costs 
There are four general types of mechanisms for imposing costs. While this article 
briefly mentions all of them, only the fourth will be explored in detail. The first and most 
coercive mechanism, is the use of criminal law.  For example, in Jacobson v. 
Massachusetts, the United States Supreme Court recognized that a state can impose a fine 
for failure to obtain an immunization against a communicable disease that the state 
reasonably believes is threatening the community (Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 
11, 25-27 (1905)). The criminal approach assumes that those who do not receive 
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vaccinations have an even higher level of culpability than negligence. Because the 
possibility of imposing costs through criminal law liability is a subject that deserves its 
own treatment, it is not explored in this article.  
The second mechanism is the use of the coercive power of the law to condition 
social activities on vaccination without formally invoking criminal law.  Today we 
enforce mandatory vaccination policies primarily through attendance at school (or, in 
some states, only public school).  It makes a great deal of sense to use school attendance 
as the conditioning factor because of the importance of immunizing children and the 
potential for contagion at schools.  On the other hand, there are additional activities that 
could be dependent upon vaccination, too.  For example, the use of public meeting places 
likes parks, pools and water parks, government buildings, theaters, sporting venues, 
shopping centers, and other public accommodations could each be conditioned on the 
vaccination of the people using it although, admittedly, enforcing these restrictions could 
prove challenging and people may resist the requirement to carry evidence of their 
vaccination status whenever they are in public.  Like mandatory vaccination for school 
attendance policies, these other vaccination requirements could allow for vaccination opt-
outs or could be enforced only when particular legally identified circumstances occur. 
For example, they could be enforced only when there is an outbreak of a disease or the 
vaccination level in the community falls below herd immunity levels.  
The third mechanism is to allow suits in negligence for non-vaccination. This 
possibility, and its challenges, have been discussed elsewhere (Caplan, 2012; Reiss, 
2014). However, bringing a negligence case is not easy; even meritorious cases may be 
difficult for plaintiffs to win because there may be substantial problems in proving 
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causation, and because they will need to overcome the duty hurdle. In addition, on a 
social level, negligence actions are a highly inefficient way to resolve disputes, in large 
part because the cost of enforcing an obligation through the use of negligence law is very 
high.  So while this approach provides an option, it is likely that other more effective and 
efficient legal devices are available to encourage vaccination and properly distribute the 
cost of the failure to vaccinate.  
The fourth alternative mechanism for imposing costs, and the one this article 
examines in depth, is a no-fault approach that seeks to force every person who opts out to 
internalize the cost of the failure to vaccinate so that the one who incurs the cost is the 
one who bears it. The no-fault approach would cause those who decide against 
vaccination to internalize the cost of that decision by imposing a tax, fee, premium or 
other cost equal to the actuarially based cost of avoiding the immunization.  Like the 
Arizona Stupid Motorist Act, or similar statutes allowing for the collection of rescue 
costs for lost hikers and skiers, or like the federal Superfund administered by the EPA, 
which is based on ordinary principles of negligence, the justifications for putting such a 
scheme in place to impose costs associated with the failure to vaccinate may draw on the 
culpability of the action.  Alternatively, efforts to impose costs may be more like 
governments’ attempts to collect the direct costs of their services like city trash collection 
fees (where the fees collected must actually cover the costs of trash collection) or bridge 
tolls (where the toll is priced to cover bond payments on the bridge and operating 
expenses).  Cost imposition may have some of the attributes of congestion pricing, like 
the costs being imposed on drivers of cars that enter central London or demand-based 
parking pricing in San Francisco, where the price goes up as the number of users (in our 
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case, non-vaccinators) goes up, increasing the cost to society.  Imposition of costs could 
also be analogous to the “headless motorcycle rider” statutes being suggested in some 
states where the fee to register a motorcycle that could be driven by someone without a 
helmet would reflect the additional costs to society of that risk (estimated to be between 
$600 and $1000 each year above the regular registration fee). While some of the costs of 
these actions are already internalized (after all, non-vaccinators’ children may acquire 
these diseases) without an effective legal intervention, many of the costs associated with 
communicable diseases are imposed on vaccinated members of society or those who 
cannot be vaccinated.  
The mechanisms discussed here all probably require a legislative change.  
 
No-Fault Tools for Covering the Costs Associated with Non-Vaccinating 
Ex Ante Tools: Taxes, Fees or Costs 
One way to manage the problem of the costs of non-vaccinating is to impose the 
costs of the choice not to vaccinate upfront, ex-ante (before the fact). In other words, we 
can make those who do not vaccinate pay a certain sum to the public purse or insurance 
companies to cover costs imposed by the outbreak they cause before an outbreak ever 
happens. This approach has the advantage of supplying the money in advance, of 
distributing the costs of the risk they create among the entire non-vaccinating population, 
and of absolving the government from showing causation. It can, however, run into 
implementation problems, including the difficulty of assessing an appropriate amount, of 
identifying non-vaccinating parents and collecting the money. It also imposes costs on 
those who may never actually cause an outbreak. In a sense, this approach makes the 
non-vaccinating pay for the risk they create, not for costs they impose.  
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There are many ways in which such fees, taxes or costs could be assessed and 
imposed.  As noted earlier, currently the most common mechanism for assuring 
childhood immunization in the United States is the requirement that parents provide proof 
of vaccination at the time of their children’s school registration.  Current law in all states 
allows parents to opt out of vaccination for their children when it is medically prudent to 
do so, and the law in all but two states permits parents to opt out for other reasons, 
including religious, philosophical or personal objections.  Thus, the least disruptive way 
to have parents internalize the cost of failing to vaccinate their children may be to impose 
an opt out fee equal to the actual cost to all of society of having another child 
unvaccinated.   This fee might vary by locality, by incidence of disease, or by the number 
of others who have opted out.  As the number of whooping cough cases increases, for 
example, the opt out fee could increase; as the number of people opting out of whooping 
cough immunization increases, the opt out fee could increase. The need for flexibility and 
the fact that fees will vary according to circumstances, suggests that the fee should be 
determined by an administrative agency rather than by legislation, potentially in a manner 
similar to the assessment of utilities rates. For example, states use Public Utility 
Commissions to periodically determine energy rates. While rate setting is complex, states 
are accustomed to grappling with this challenge and could apply their experience to non-
vaccination as well. Furthermore, using commissioners appointed for fixed, lengthy 
terms, ideally with expertise in related fields, can help isolate the process from political 
pressures.  
While Jacobson held that the right to opt out for medical reasons was 
Constitutionally protected by the due process clause, all other opt outs could be assessed 
Moser,	  Reiss,	  Schwartz	  Funding	  Costs;	  Draft,	  do	  not	  cite	  or	  quote	  without	  permission	  of	  authors	  3	  June	  2014	  
20	  	  
a consistent fee because, regardless of their different underlying reasons, these decisions 
impose the same cost on society. When transferring these costs to those who decide not to 
vaccinate, the state would be making a purely economic determination devoid of moral 
judgment and without evaluation of the sincerity or honesty of the parents. In fact, the 
statute creating the scheme would determine which opt out factors may be considered. 
 Of course, an opt out fee is not the only way that parents could be effectively 
required to internalize the costs they impose on others by failing to vaccinate their 
children.  The cost could be assessed as a tax payable along with income or other taxes to 
the federal government or the state, or those who do vaccinate themselves and their 
children could be given tax credits (Parkins, 2012). Alternatively, cash grants or benefits 
could be provided to families in which everyone is vaccinated.  Politically, it is easier to 
allow for tax credits and deductions than to impose penalties, although behavioral 
research suggests that the incentive value of a penalty is greater than the incentive value 
of a credit or deduction, even when the formal economic value of each is the same.   
 
The actuarial work required to determine the appropriate cost of an opt-out and the 
collection of any such fees could be effectively delegated to private instead of a public 
agencies, as well.  For example, one of the primary costs of failure to vaccinate is the 
medical cost incurred by the unvaccinated person.  Currently, the ACA allows for health 
coverage premiums to be rated on only four grounds:  (1) age, (2) geography, (3) 
smoking status, and, sometimes, (4) participation in wellness programs.  Vaccination 
status could be an additional rating factor used in policies recognized under the ACA 
(and, presumably, other policies as well).   In fact, the decision to have a vaccination, like 
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the decision to have a blood pressure measurement done, could be considered evidence of 
participation in a wellness program.  Anyone can participate in a vaccination program, 
and anyone can succeed without reference to their health status; thus, a program offering 
vaccinations to those who for whom they are medically appropriate would seem to meet 
the requirements for ACA recognized wellness programs.  Those who do not get 
recommended immunizations without a medically valid reason, though, would be subject 
to higher monthly insurance premiums and would be forced to internalize at least a part 
of the costs of the failure to vaccinate (Lobel and Amir, 2011).   
 
The Public Use of Revenue Raised from Taxes and Fees Imposed on Non- 
Vaccination  
A tax or fee might be used to raise general revenue for the government, but a tax on 
failure to vaccinate may be seen as harsh and unfair to those who have made religiously 
or philosophically driven decisions to avoid vaccination.  There may be far greater public 
support for a tax or fee that is designated for particular purposes related to the failure to 
vaccinate.  For example, the revenue can be used to pay the cost of vaccinations, the cost 
of tracing the source of communicable diseases, the cost of caring for those who are 
injured by the failure to vaccinate, the cost of public and professional education about 
immunization, and the pain and suffering of those who could not protect themselves 
against the underlying diseases. If a state decides to use a no-fault mechanism to impose 
the cost of non-vaccination on those who should bear it, it would make political and 
economic sense to direct the resources to a fund to be used for that purpose. 
Every tax, fee or other incentive with regard to immunization will have to be 
consistent with the Constitutional limitations of the due process clauses of the Fifth and 
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Fourteenth Amendments, and with the religion clauses of the First Amendment.  Since 
the United States Supreme Court approved the imposition of criminal penalties against 
those who refused locally mandated vaccinations for other than medical reasons a century 
ago, it is hard to question the general validity of such laws. Indeed, if criminal penalties 
intended to compel compliance are justifiable, then the imposition of other fees and taxes 
that are related to the actual cost of noncompliance seem likely to be Constitutionally 
sound.   
Since the Supreme Court upheld the state use of mandatory school attendance law 
to enforce vaccination laws in Zucht v. King, it has been clear that a state can enforce its 
immunization requirements through school registration requirements (Zucht v. King, 260 
U.S. 174 (1922)).  Because Jacobson was decided before the First Amendment was 
applied against states, there may still be a free exercise clause argument against requiring 
vaccinations that are contrary to religious principles.  On the other hand, limitations put 
on free exercise claims to exemptions from generally applicable laws in the Smith case 
(1991) strongly suggest that such arguments will not be successful, at least under current 
law.  The United States Constitution is unlikely to hinder any state action imposing a tax, 
fee, penalty, or any other cost on someone who does not arrange for vaccinations required 
by law without having a medical excuse. 
 
Ex Post: Billing by Public Health Authorities 
An alternative to an ex-ante approach is to allow the public health authority to 
recoup their costs after the fact by sending a bill to a family whose decision not to 
vaccinate caused the outbreak. This approach has the advantage of adhering to traditional 
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principles of causation, and prevents the problem of determining and implementing a fee 
or tax structure by connecting the amount collected to the harm caused. It has the 
disadvantages of requiring proof of causation – not always easy – and of placing the 
entire cost on one family or a few families rather than distributing it across all non-
vaccinating individuals, making that family bear the costs associated with a choice made 
by many, regardless of their ability to bear the cost.  
While this approach draws on tort principles of individual responsibility and 
causation, it creates a public law remedy.  
Under the Free Public Services Doctrine, municipalities cannot recoup costs of 
services needed because of a citizen’s negligence absent a statute (Krauss, 2006; Lytton, 
2002). The most compelling rationale for this controversial doctrine is that part of 
government’s role is to provide services to the public financed via taxation that spreads 
the costs to all citizens (Lytton, 2002). Deciding how to allocate the costs of providing 
services should be left to the democratically elected legislature, as a matter of public 
policy, not to the courts (32 A.L.R. 6th 261; Krauss, 2006). We are unsure if this doctrine 
bars recovery in this instance; however, we believe that there is a case for allowing the 
courts to recoup these costs under a public nuisance doctrine, by analogy, especially since 
many states and municipalities have public nuisance statutes that can provide the 
statutory basis the Free Public Services Doctrine requires. See, for example, Cincinnati v. 
Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1136 (Ohio 2002) (holding that a city's allegation that 
the negligent conduct of the handgun manufacturers, trade associations, and handgun 
distributor, relating to the manufacture and distribution of firearms, involved continuing 
misconduct and stated a claim for recoupment of costs of government services, such as 
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police, emergency, health, corrections, and prosecution services under a public nuisance 
theory); A lead paint case awarding damage on a series of public nuisance (California v. 
Atl. Richfield Co., 2014 WL 280526 (Cal.Super.)).  
But handling the problem via a statutory scheme of some kind has substantial 
advantages. For example, it would allow the polity to decide, via the democratic process, 
on the terms for imposing such liability and the process for handling it. In addition, it 
would offer the opportunity to create a more streamlined and efficient administrative 
process rather than requiring an adversarial one. For those reasons, we propose a statute 
that will create a mechanism for recouping the costs of outbreak caused by non-
vaccinating.  
 
Potential Models: Existing Statutes Imposing Costs 
Statutes imposing costs of public services on citizens exist in a variety of contexts 
(see Table 2). Several states have statutes allowing the state to recoup the costs of 
environmental hazards. For example, agencies may recoup the costs of handling fires 
(Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 76.04.495 (West 2014); Cal. Health & Saf. Code §13009 et 
seq. (West 2014); N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 106-947 (West 2014)) or hazardous spills (Nev. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 459.537 (2), (3) (West 2014); Alaska Stat. Ann. § 46.03.822 (West 
2014); N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 166A-27 (West 2014)). States and municipalities also have 
statutes allowing recovery in damages for nuisance. Nuisance can be defined  broadly – 
for example, California law defines it as “Anything which is injurious to health, 
including, but not limited to, the illegal sale of controlled substances, or is indecent or 
offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere 
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with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, or unlawfully obstructs the free 
passage or use, in the customary manner, of any navigable lake, or river, bay, stream, 
canal, or basin, or any public park, square, street, or highway, is a nuisance.” (Cal. Civ. 
Code § 3479 (West 2014)). Most examples relate to inadequate property management 
that causes harm to others (see, e.g. Sacramento City Code 8.04.100 available at: 
http://qcode.us/codes/sacramento/) though the principle can be seen as broad enough to 
encompass non-vaccination. While that is not the focus of this article, it is certainly a 
possibility.  
In addition to requiring property owners and others causing environmental hazards 
to internalize the costs of their choices, these laws also reflect a value judgment. In 
particular, they support the idea that the public should not have to pay for the costs of 
those behaviors. They can also help deter such problematic behavior by imposing costs 
on the actors. This the same logic we wish to apply to non-vaccination.  
Finally, a small number of states have statutes addressing recovery of costs spent on 
rescuing an individual from a dangerous situation created by the individual’s own 
negligence. For example, the Arizona Stupid Motorist Act (Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-
910 (West 2014)) allows non-profit and public entities to collect costs expended in 
rescuing a driver who, ignoring barricades (or otherwise behaving recklessly), drives a 
vehicle onto a public street or highway that is temporarily covered by floodwaters. 
Similarly, North Carolina has a statute that allows government agencies to recover costs 
incurred in rescuing someone during an emergency if the person rescued ignored a 
warning (N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 166A-19.62 (West 2014)). The logic behind these 
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statutes is that if the need for public assistance was brought about by an individual’s 
highly culpable behavior, then the individual should reimburse the public purse.  
Drawing on these existing models, we propose a statute that imposes the costs on 
those whose choice to note vaccinate caused them. The statute follows the logic 
embodied in existing recovery statutes, and draws heavily on the Arizona statute for its 
specifics.  
Bill Text: 
Title of Bill: Recovering Costs of Outbreaks Caused by Non-Vaccinating  
SECTION 1: A person whose decision not to vaccinate herself or a minor 
under her control caused or contributed to an outbreak of an infectious 
disease is liable for the costs incurred by public agencies in containing and 
treating the disease if:  
(a) Vaccination of said individual and/or minor against the disease is 
recommended by the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices 
(ACIP). 
(b) The individual chose to forgo said vaccination for non-medical 
reasons.  
(c) Vaccination of the individual and minor would, more likely than not, 
have prevented the outbreak.  
In considering which costs, if any, to impose on that individual, the 
agency will consider: 
1. How contagious the disease is.  
2. The rate of complications imposing long-term costs from the disease.  
3. The difficulty of investigating the disease.  
4. Other equities, such as objective difficulties in obtaining a vaccine or 
getting a child vaccinated.  
 
SECTION 2: violation of section 1 is a public nuisance.  
 
SECTION 3: The agency or agencies responsible for containing and 
managing the outbreak will determine that the requirements above are 
fulfilled, assess the costs of investigation, containment and treatment and 
provide the liable party with a reasoned decision and an itemized bill. 
Once provided, the charge constitutes a debt of that person and may be 
collected proportionately by the public agencies that incurred the 
expenses. 
 
SECTION 4: An individual determined by the agency or agencies to be 
liable under Sections 1 and 2 may appeal the decision to impose costs, and 
such an appeal will be heard by a hearing officer in the billing agency or 
in the state’s Department of Health (in the case of a private entity) 
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according to the procedures enumerated in §556-557 of the Administrative 
Procedures Act or the state equivalent. The agency’s final decision may be 
appealed to the state’s courts.  
 
SECTION 5: The State Department of Health will have the authority to 
promulgate rules to implement this statute.   
 
SECTION 6: Qualifying for a religious or personal belief exemption under 
state law is not a defense against liability.  
 
SECTION 7: A notice of this potential liability will be provided to parents or 
patient at each doctor visit in which vaccines should be offered according to the 
CDC’s immunization schedule and along with the form used to obtain an 
exemption from the state’s immunization requirements. 
 
 
Discussion  
The statute makes not vaccinating a public nuisance and forcing individuals to 
internalize those costs. It thus fits comfortably within the ideas of personal responsibility 
embodied in our system: individuals are free (subject to other applicable rules, like school 
immunization requirements) not to vaccinate themselves or their children. If, however, an 
individual’s choice creates risk, then the individual is required to pay for those risks if 
they materialize. The specific risk the statute enacts is the costs of outbreaks borne by 
those having to contain them. By using principles of nuisance, it justifies liability whether 
or not we view not vaccinating as negligent. By requiring causation, it keeps the 
principles of justice that justify compensation in other contexts.  
The statute’s remedy here is a public law remedy. That means that it needs to 
follow public law norms in substance and procedures. The decision must be based on the 
appropriate criteria. Procedurally, it must be reasoned and transparent. Once written and 
reasoned, allowing the entity seeking reimbursement to collect it as a debt – again, 
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following the Arizona statute – makes the initial process of recouping costs more 
efficient and streamlined.  
The statutes offer the individual a process to challenge the decision via, in the first 
instance, an appeal to the public agency. In contrast to the simple, streamlined initial 
billing, the appeal process includes full formal adjudicatory procedures as described in 
the Administrative Procedures Act (or the state equivalent – for the purposes of the 
statute, the Administrative Procedures serves as a model and source of procedures). This 
will provide the parties the right to bring witnesses and documents and rights of cross-
examination, as far as feasible. By offering an adversarial process, the statute offers the 
non-vaccinating party ample opportunity to correct errors in the initial decision. But by 
making the first step administrative it assures that the decision will be heard by officials 
with expertise in administrative adjudications and prevents adding burden to the courts. 
Courts will judicially review the decision if there is further appeal, but will not have to 
undertake the initial fact-finding.  
In section 5, the statute clarifies that the state’s decision to allow unvaccinated 
children to attend school if they obtain an exemption does not relieve the parent making 
that problematic choice from having to bear the cost of that choice to the public.  
Both fairness and deterrence support providing notice to the individual beforehand 
of the potential costs. While individuals are on constructive notice of the law – not 
knowing the law is not a defense – it would be more effective and fair to provide 
individuals with a direct warning, if possible. Of course, if an individual does not visit a 
doctor or apply for an exemption, it may be impossible to alert them, but if there is an 
opportunity, they should be put on notice. Section 6 enacts a requirement of notifying the 
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individual in two circumstances: during a doctor visit where vaccines are discussed, and 
if an individual applies for an exemption.  
 
Conclusion 
Not vaccinating has direct costs: beyond a certain level, it can and does increase the 
incidence of preventable diseases. Outbreaks, in turn, lead to direct monetary costs that 
often cannot be anticipated in advance, both the costs of treating the disease and the costs 
of containing it. When those costs come out of the public purse, resources are diverted 
from other needs, and important public values can suffer. There is abundant data showing 
that modern vaccines are effective and safe, and their small risks are far outweighed by 
their tremendous benefits. From this perspective, it is appropriate to require those who 
choose not to vaccinate to internalize the costs of that choice, rather than imposing them 
on the public. There are several tools available to allow that. We should use them.  
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Legal Authority 
 
Federal Statutes 
 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), 111 P.L. 148, 124 Stat. 119, 2010 
Enacted H.R. 3590, 111 Enacted H.R. 3590 (2010). 
 
Federal Case Law 
 
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. ___ (2012), 132 S.Ct 2566 (2012). 
 
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872  (1990). 
 
Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922). 
 
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905). 
 
Pennsylvania v. Gen. Pub. Utils. Corp., 710 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1983). 
 
State Statutes  
 
Alaska Stat. Ann. § 46.03.822 (West 2014). 
 
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-910 (West 2014). 
 
Cal. Civ. Code § 3479 (West 2014). 
 
Cal. Health & Saf. Code §13009 et seq. (West 2014). 
 
N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 106-947 (West 2014). 
 
N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 166A-19.62 (West 2014). 
 
N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 166A-27 (West 2014). 
 
Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 459.537 (West 2014). 
 
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 76.04.495 (West 2014). 
 
 
State Case Law 
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Commonwealth v. Twitchell, 617 N.E.2d 609 (Mass. 1993).  
 
Shorter v. Drury, 695 P.2d 116 (Wash. 1985), cert. denied Shorter v. Drury, 474 U.S. 827 
(1985). 
 
State v. Norman, 808 P.2d 1159 (Wash. App. 1991). 
 
Reed v. Tacoma Ry. & Power Comp., 188 P. 409 (Wash. 1921). 
 
International Caselaw 
 
Vaughan v. Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.P.) (1837) 
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Appendix	  B:	  Table	  2:	  Statutes	  Addressing	  Cost	  Recovery	  	  	  
Goal: Agency recovery for costs incurred during response to vaccine 
preventable disease outbreaks.   
Issue: Public cost recovery for action is generally barred the Municipal Cost 
Recovery Rule or Free Public Services Doctrine. 
In general, courts do not allow state, municipal, or government agencies 
to recover in common law for costs expended carrying out public services 
from the tort-feasors whose negligent conduct caused the need for those 
services.  The common-law rule by which the courts are guided in these 
instances is the “municipal cost recovery rule” (county, state, or 
municipality) or “free public services doctrine” (government agency).  
The doctrines (which are used interchangeably by the courts) provide that, 
“absent specific statutory authorization or damage to government-owned 
property, a government agency, county, state or municipality cannot 
recover the costs of carrying out public services from a tort-feasor whose 
conduct caused the need for the services.”  (32 A.L.R. 6th 261.)   
 
The primary rationale behind the free public services doctrine is that, 
absent specific statutory authorization, state legislatures establish local 
governments to provide core services for the public and pay for these 
services by spreading the costs to all citizens through taxation.  That the 
question of whether the costs of providing the public service should be 
spread among all taxpayers, or reallocated in some other manner, 
necessarily implicates fiscal policy, and, therefore, falls within the special 
purview of the legislature, not the court.  (32 A.L.R. 6th 261.)  
 
Other suggested rationales are that tortfeasors owe government entities no 
duty of care that would support recovery, and that the doctrine suggests 
that courts should avoid upsetting settled expectations.   
Means of 
overcoming 
a 
presumptio
n of Free 
Public 
Services: 
Emergency 
Response 
Recovery 
Statutes, 
e.g.  
Pubic Nuisance Ordinances Model 
State 
Emergenc
y Health 
Powers 
Act 
Recovery 
Sources: 
Forest Fires: 
See e.g.,  
Cal. Health 
Common law doctrine, qualified by statute 
and ordinances: 
see e.g., 
MODEL 
STATE 
EMERGEN
CY 
HEALTH 
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& Saf. Code 
§13009 et 
seq. 
(authorizing 
a California 
public 
agency 
plaintiff to 
seek 
damages 
from tort-
feasors 
responsible 
for 
negligently 
starting 
forest fires);  
 
RCW 
76.04.495 
(authorizing 
Washington 
State, 
municipaliti
es, and 
agencies in 
a like 
manner to 
CA’s 
§13009 et 
seq.) 
 
-Also note:- 
 
“Any 
person who 
personally 
or through 
another 
wilfully, 
CA Cal. Civ. Code §3479 et seq. 
 of note : 
“Anything which is injurious to health, 
including, but not limited to, the illegal sale of 
controlled substances, or is indecent or 
offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to 
the free use of property, so as to interfere with 
the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, 
or unlawfully obstructs the free passage or 
use, in the customary manner, of any 
navigable lake, or river, bay, stream, canal, or 
basin, or any public park, square, street, or 
highway, is a nuisance.” 
(Cal. Civ. Code § 3479.) 
 
“A public nuisance is one which affects at the 
same time an entire community or 
neighborhood, or any considerable number of 
persons, although the extent of the annoyance 
or damage inflicted upon individuals may be 
unequal.”     
§3480 
 
“Every nuisance not included in the definition 
of the last section is private.”     
§3481 
 
-however- 
 
“Nothing which is done or maintained under 
the express authority of a statute can be 
deemed a nuisance.” 
(Cal. Civ. Code § 3482.) 
 
-providing a right of action for recovery for 
abatement of a nuisance- 
 
“An action may be brought by any person 
whose property is injuriously affected, or 
whose personal enjoyment is lessened by a 
POWERS 
ACT 
As of 
December 
21, 2001 
 
 
There's 
nothing 
directly on 
point, but it 
seems like 
there is an 
opportunity 
for a statute 
authorizing 
recovery 
to be in 
there-  
 
Specifically 
§§ 803-
805  
- CA has 
enacted 
§803  
- CA had 
not enacted 
§804 as of 
2006, 
though 
23/28 
states 
enacting 
some 
portion of 
the 
MSEHPA 
had. 
 
(note: this 
research 
may not be 
current 
through SB 
1430 
(introduced 
2006 by 
Sen. Elaine 
Alquist), the 
Local 
Pandemic 
and 
Emergency 
Health 
Preparedne
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negligently, 
or in 
violation of 
law, sets 
fire to, 
allows fire 
to be set to, 
or allows a 
fire kindled 
or attended 
by him to 
escape to, 
the property 
of another, 
whether 
privately or 
publicly 
owned, is 
liable to the 
owner of 
such 
property for 
any 
damages to 
the property 
caused by 
the fire. 
(Cal. Health 
& Saf. Code 
§13007) 
 
and 
 
“Any 
person who 
allows any 
fire burning 
upon his 
property to 
escape to 
nuisance, as defined in Section 3479 of the 
Civil Code, and by the judgment in that 
action the nuisance may be enjoined or 
abated as well as damages recovered 
therefor. A civil action may be brought in 
the name of the people of the State of 
California to abate a public nuisance, as 
defined in Section 3480 of the Civil Code, 
by the district attorney or county counsel of 
any county in which the nuisance exists, or 
by the city attorney of any town or city in 
which the nuisance exists. Each of those 
officers shall have concurrent right to bring 
an action for a public nuisance existing 
within a town or city . The district attorney, 
county counsel, or city attorney of any 
county or city in which the nuisance exists 
shall bring an action whenever directed by 
the board of supervisors of the county, or 
whenever directed by the legislative 
authority of the town or city.” 
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §731 
-representative public nuisance ordinances- 
 
Sacramento: (Sacramento City Code available 
at http://qcode.us/codes/sacramento/) 
Sacramento City Code 8.04.100 [Nuisances] 
Generally 
 It is unlawful and a misdemeanor and hereby 
declared a public nuisance for any person 
owning, leasing, occupying or having charge 
or possession of any premises in this city to 
maintain such premises in such a manner that 
any one or more of the conditions or activities 
described in the following subsections are 
found to exist and allowed to continue: 
     A.     The keeping, storage, depositing, or 
accumulation on the premises of any personal 
property which is within the view of persons 
on adjacent or nearby real property or the 
ss Act- I 
don’t 
believe that 
that act 
addressed 
these 
issues, but 
it will need 
to be 
checked 
out) 
 
MSEHPA 
§803 
Financing 
and 
Expenses 
- Nothing 
directly on 
point, but 
this is 
where the 
structure of 
the 
financing is 
established 
(where 
money is 
coming 
from, etc.) 
 
 
§804 
Liability 
- This is 
mostly 
granting 
immunity, 
but there is 
relevant 
language in 
(b)(4): 
 
(a) State 
immunity 
(creating 
State 
immunity.) 
 
(b) Private 
liability. 
((1) – (3) 
create 
immunities 
for private 
parties 
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the property 
of another, 
whether 
privately or 
publicly 
owned, 
without 
exercising 
due 
diligence to 
control such 
fire, is liable 
to the owner 
of such 
property for 
the damages 
to the 
property 
caused by 
the fire.” 
(Cal. Health 
& Saf. Code 
§13008) 
 
Hazardous 
spills: 
See e.g., 
 
NRS 459.53
7 (2), 
(3)  (Nevada
) 
(authorizing 
municipal 
or state 
agency 
recovery 
action from 
persons 
responsible 
public right-of-way when such personal 
property constitutes visual blight, reduces the 
aesthetic appearance of the neighborhood, is 
offensive to the senses, or is detrimental to 
nearby property or property values. Personal 
property includes, but is not limited to, junk 
as defined in Section 8.04.090 of this chapter, 
abandoned, wrecked, or dismantled 
automobiles… 
O.     Any illegal activity occurring on the 
property which is detrimental to the life, 
health, safety and welfare of the residents, 
neighbors or public. For purposes of this 
chapter, illegal activity is defined as any 
violation of state or federal law, rules or 
regulations, or local ordinance; 
 
Recovery statute example, Sacramento: 
Sacramento City Code 8.28.040 Lien or 
personal obligation. [referencing weed and 
rubbish abatement] 
The cost of abatement shall be assessed 
against the parcel as a lien or made a personal 
obligation of the owner, and may be made a 
special assessment, as set forth in Chapter 
8.04 of this title. 
 
San Francisco: 
SF Municipal Code available at 
http://www.amlegal.com/library/ca/sfrancisco
.shtml 
Recovery is authorized for abatement of 
public health nuisances relating to 
environmental health, including: 
• mosquito control and prevention 
• mold prevention (pdf) 
• dirty needles 
• garbage accumulation 
• rodents 
• neglected and overgrown vegetation 
involved in 
emergency 
response) 
 
-However, 
there is 
some 
language in 
(4) that is 
relevant: 
 
(4) The 
immunities 
provided in 
this 
Subsection 
shall not 
apply to 
any private 
person, 
firm, or 
corporation 
or 
employees 
and agents 
of such 
person, 
firm, or 
corporation 
whose act 
or omission 
caused in 
whole or in 
part the 
public 
health 
emergency 
and who 
would 
otherwise 
be liable 
therefor. 
 
(Legislative 
History.  
Section 804 
is adapted 
from 2001 
ILL. LAWS 
73(15), 
(21).) 
 
§805 
Compensat
ion 
Deals 
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for a leak or 
spill of, or 
an accident 
involving 
hazardous 
waste, 
hazardous 
material or a 
regulated 
substance); 
 
Alaska Stat. 
§ 46.03.822 
(creating a 
strict 
liability for 
recovery of 
costs 
associated 
with the 
spill of 
hazardous 
substances)  
Text 
Including:  
“the costs of 
response, 
containment
, removal, 
or remedial 
action 
incurred by 
the state, a 
municipality
, or a 
village, and 
for the 
additional 
costs of a 
function or 
• stagnant water causing mosquito 
breeding 
• bird and animal waste 
• pigeon nuisance 
• safety hazards 
• chemical/offensive odors  
• too many pets 
• unsanitary living conditions, hoarding 
• inoperative vehicles on private 
property 
(http://www.sfdph.org/dph/EH/codeEnforce/d
efault.asp) 
 
San Fransisco City Code Art. 11, Sec. 581: 
Prohibited Public Health Nuisances 
 (a)   No Person shall have upon any premises 
or real property owned, occupied or 
controlled by him, or her, or it any public 
nuisance. 
 (b)   The following conditions are hereby 
declared to be a public nuisance: 
(1)   Any accumulation of filth, garbage, 
decayed or spoiled food, unsanitary debris or 
waste material or decaying animal … 
(16)   Anything else that the Director deems 
to be a threat to public health and safety. 
 
Brief analysis of SF: 
 
Note that public health nuisance has been 
used in other instances despite the list, for 
example the Occupy protestors were declared 
a public health nuisance in order to allow the 
city to ‘abate’ their presence.  (See CBS, 
Occupy SF Camp Declared Public Health 
Nuisance; Eviction Deadline Passes (nov. 18, 
2011) 
http://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2011/11/18/o
ccupy-sf-camp-declared-public-health-
nuisance-eviction-deadline-passes/) 
largely with 
those 
seeking 
compensati
on from the 
state 
(Legislative 
History.  
Section 805 
is adapted 
from Colo. 
Rev. Stat. 
§24-32-
2111.5)   
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service, 
including 
administrati
ve expenses 
for the 
incremental 
costs of 
providing 
the function 
or service, 
that are 
incurred by 
the state, a 
municipality
, or a 
village, and 
the costs of 
projects or 
activities 
that are 
delayed or 
lost because 
of the 
efforts of 
the state, the 
municipality
, or the 
village, 
resulting 
from an 
unpermitted 
release of a 
hazardous 
substance 
or, with 
respect to 
response 
costs, the 
substantial 
threat of an 
 
Subd. (16) would seem to be fairly open, and 
seems to have been used that way (see 
Occupy Protestors), however Sec. 581 lists 
conditions that are specific to real property, 
and use of that subdivision beyond property 
conditions would seem to be subject to 
challenge on statutory interpretation grounds. 
Article 11 continues by providing city 
agencies (specifically the Dept. of Public 
Heatlth and Police) with the power to inspect 
premises (Sec. 595) and provide notice of 
violation and the subsequent administrative 
action (Secs. 596, 596.5), which includes 
orders of abatement and provides that the 
Director may abate the nuisance if the owner 
does not comply (596, subd. (f)), or if the 
nuisance creates an ‘immediate danger to 
health or safety’ (596.5, subd. (a)).  
 
Cost recovery, including attorneys fees, for 
city abatement is authorized at Sec. 596, subd. 
(i)(3) and Administrative fines including cost 
recovery are authorized at Sec. 596.5.  Sec. 
599 further authorizes and details how the 
Director shall (shall, not may) ascertain the 
administrative costs incurred in abating the 
nuisance and details how the costs shall be 
collected from the property owner. 
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unpermitted 
release of a 
hazardous 
substance” 
 
Reckless 
Motorist 
(The 
Arizona 
‘Stupid 
Motorist’ 
Law 
(Ariz. Rev. 
Stat. § 28-
910 (Lexis 
2014) 
(creating a 
municipal 
cost 
recovery for 
costs 
accrued in 
rescue 
operations 
for 
motorists 
who 
intentionally 
or 
recklessly 
ignore 
warnings of 
flood and 
washout 
conditions) 
Text:  
A.  A driver 
of a vehicle 
who drives 
the vehicle 
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on a public 
street or 
highway 
that is 
temporarily 
covered by 
a rise in 
water level, 
including 
groundwater 
or overflow 
of water, 
and that is 
barricaded 
because of 
flooding is 
liable for 
the 
expenses of 
any 
emergency 
response 
that is 
required to 
remove 
from the 
public street 
or highway 
the driver or 
any 
passenger in 
the vehicle 
that 
becomes 
inoperable 
on the 
public street 
or highway 
or the 
vehicle that 
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becomes 
inoperable 
on the 
public street 
or highway, 
or both. 
B.  A person 
convicted of 
violating 
section 28-
693 for 
driving a 
vehicle into 
any area 
that is 
temporarily 
covered by 
a rise in 
water level, 
including 
groundwater 
or overflow 
of water, 
may be 
liable for 
expenses of 
any 
emergency 
response 
that is 
required to 
remove 
from the 
area the 
driver or 
any 
passenger in 
the vehicle 
that 
becomes 
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inoperable 
in the area 
or the 
vehicle that 
becomes 
inoperable 
in the area, 
or both. 
C.  The 
expenses of 
an 
emergency 
response are 
a charge 
against the 
person 
liable for 
those 
expenses 
pursuant to 
subsection 
A or B of 
this section. 
The charge 
constitutes a 
debt of that 
person and 
may be 
collected 
proportionat
ely by the 
public 
agencies, 
for-profit 
entities or 
not-for-
profit 
entities that 
incurred the 
expenses. 
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The person's 
liability for 
the 
expenses of 
an 
emergency 
response 
shall not 
exceed two 
thousand 
dollars for a 
single 
incident. 
The liability 
imposed 
under this 
section is in 
addition to 
and not in 
limitation of 
any other 
liability that 
may be 
imposed. 
D.  An 
insurance 
policy may 
exclude 
coverage for 
a person's 
liability for 
expenses of 
an 
emergency 
response 
under this 
section. 
E.  For the 
purposes of 
this section: 
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1.  
"Expenses 
of an 
emergency 
response" 
means 
reasonable 
costs 
directly 
incurred 
by public 
agencies, 
for-profit 
entities or 
not-for-
profit 
entities 
that make 
an 
appropriat
e 
emergency 
response 
to an 
incident. 
2.  "Public 
agency" 
means this 
state and 
any city, 
county, 
municipal 
corporatio
n, district 
or other 
public 
authority 
that is 
located in 
whole or 
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in part in 
this state 
and that 
provides 
police, fire 
fighting, 
medical or 
other 
emergency 
services. 
3.  
"Reasonab
le costs" 
includes 
the costs 
of 
providing 
police, fire 
fighting, 
rescue and 
emergency 
medical 
services at 
the scene 
of an 
incident 
and the 
salaries of 
the 
persons 
who 
respond to 
the 
incident 
but does 
not include 
charges 
assessed 
by an 
ambulance 
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service 
that is 
regulated 
pursuant to 
title 36, 
chapter 
21.1, 
article 2. 
 
Notable or 
Representat
ive Cases: 
 
Public 
Nuisance 
Note that courts are split as to whether or not cost recovery for public 
nuisance can overcome the municipal cost recovery rule. (See e.g.   City 
of Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 277 F.3d 415, Prod. Liab. Rep. 
(CCH) P 16241 (3d Cir. 2002) (applying Pennsylvania law), (recognizing 
that there is some authority for an exception to the municipal cost 
recovery rule, when the public entities are seeking to recover damages for 
the costs of abating public nuisances, noting that the municipality must 
state a claim for public nuisance, the nuisance must be abatable, and the 
damages sought by the municipality must represent the cost of 
abatement). 
 
Limiting: 
(generally) 
 
Jupin v. Kask 849 N.E. 2d 829 (Mass. 2006) (holding that the estate of a 
slain police officer could not bring a public nuisance claim against the 
mother of a mentally impaired youth who had shot and killed an the 
officer with a gun acquired from the parent’s unlocked gun cabinet, noting 
that although “the improper storage of the firearms in her home interfered 
with public health morals and safety, and that this interference was a 
result of [defendant’s] negligent, reckless, and ultrahazardous conduct”, 
there was a “vast gap between this case and traditional public nuisance 
cases, such as those involving highways and navigable streams or the 
keeping of diseased animals or the maintenance of a pond breeding 
malarial mosquitoes”) 
 
Ashley Cty. v. Pfizer, Inc., 552 F.3d 659, 666-69 (8th Cir. 2009) (applying 
Arkansas law) (holding that plaintiff counties could not pursue a public 
nuisance claim against manufacturers of cold and allergy medications that 
contained the primary ingredient for methamphetamine manufacture due 
to lack of proximate cause) 
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Walker County v. Tri-State Crematory, 643 S.E.2d 324, 328-29 (cert. 
denied) (Georgia App. 2007) (holding that, where county brought 
a negligence and public nuisance action against owners and operators of a 
crematorium, and the county sought to recover the expenses it incurred in 
recovering, identifying, and properly disposing of bodies found at the 
crematorium, that where there was statutory authority providing lien and 
recovery of expenses from property owners, the county was barred from 
using public nuisance to bring an action for recovery in tort) (further 
holding that there is no exception to the free public services doctrine when 
the costs are incurred as part of the abatement of a public nuisance since if 
such an exception were recognized, it could give rise to substantial 
litigation because litigants could re-characterize many expenditures for 
public services as expenses incurred in abating a public nuisance) 
 
(lead paint) 
State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, Inc., 951 A.2d 428, 443 (R.I. 2008) (holding 
that the manufacture and use of lead paint was not a public nuisance 
because it had not ‘interfered with a public right.’) 
 
(guns) 
City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099 (Ill. 
2004), (holding that the municipal cost recovery rule precluded a city and 
a county, in a public nuisance action against firearms manufacturers, 
distributors, and dealers, from recovering for law enforcement and 
medical services expenditures allegedly incurred as a result of gun 
violence) 
 
-but see- 
 
Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1136 (Ohio 2002) 
(holding that a city's allegation that the negligent conduct of the handgun 
manufacturers, trade associations, and handgun distributor, relating to the 
manufacture and distribution of firearms, involved continuing misconduct 
and stated a claim for recoupment of costs of government services, such 
as police, emergency, health, corrections, and prosecution services under a 
public nuisance theory); 
See also, City of Gary ex rel. King v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 801 N.E.2d 
1222 (Ind. 2003);  
James v. Arms Technology, Inc., 820 A.2d 27 (N.J. 2003) 
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Notable or 
Representat
ive Cases: 
 
Hazardous 
waste or 
forest fires 
 
 
 
 
Kodiak Island Borough v. Exxon Corp., 991 P.2d 757, (Alaska 
1999) (holding that a municipality was not barred under the free public 
services doctrine from recovering from an oil vessel owner the costs of 
responding to an oil spill where the municipality sought to recover from 
the owner under state statutes) 
 
Many of the forest fire cases are against utilities and railroads, who have a 
duty created by statute (Cal Pub Resources Code § 4293) 
See State of California v. Southern Pacific Co., 133 Cal App 3d 862 
(reprinted as modified) (1983, Cal App 1st Dist); People v. Southern Cal. 
Edison Co. (1976) 56 Cal. App. 3d 593; Giorgi v. Pacific Gas & Electric 
Co., 266 Cal App 2d 355 (1968, Cal App 1st Dist) 
 
But it is also applied in other cases of negligence: 
 
See, People ex rel. Grijalva v. Superior Court, 159 Cal. App. 4th 1072 
(Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2008) (applying §13009 liability to real parties in 
interest after a construction company negligently caused a brush fire 
which burned 64,000 acres);  
 
People v. Williams, 222 Cal. App. 2d 152, 155 (Cal. App. 3d Dist. 1963) 
(refusing to extend §13009 liability to a property owner when the 
negligently caused fire was confined to her own land) 
 
Notable or 
Representat
ive Cases: 
 
Arizona 
‘Stupid 
Motorist’ 
 
The Arizona Stupid Motorist law, Arizona Revised Statute, section 28-
910, authorizes both for-profit and public entities to collect costs 
expended in rescuing a driver who drives a vehicle on to a public street or 
highway that is temporarily covered by floodwaters.  (A.R.S. § 28-190 
(A).) Public entities include state, city, county, municipal corporation, 
district or public agency, police, fire, or other emergency services.  
(A.R.S. § 28-190 (E)(2).) The costs incurred constitute a debt of that 
person, and may not exceed $2000.  (A.R.S. § 28-190 (C).) 
 The statute is rarely used, but in order to find a driver liable, the 
government must show that the driver either (1) drove around barricades 
meant to block off flooded areas, or (2) be charged and convicted for 
reckless driving for driving into a flood area even if there are no 
barricades.  (Alexis Shaw, Arizona Officials Weigh 'Stupid Motorist Law' 
for Tour Bus Driver in Flood, ABCNews (July 30, 2013) available at 
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http://abcnews.go.com/US/arizona-officials-weigh-stupid-motorist-law-
tour-bus/story?id=19817085 (quoting Chief Deputy Mojave County 
Attorney Jace Zack).) 
 	  	  
